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Introduction
The real business cycle (RBC) approach to the
study of aggregate fluctuations is now a well-
established paradigm in macroeconomics. The
early groundbreaking articles in this area
(Kydland and Prescott [1980a, 1982] and Long
and Plosser [1983]) completely abstracted from
government behavior, yet were reasonably suc-
cessful in capturing the broad comovements
and relative variabilities of the economic aggre-
gates that characterize the business cycle.
More recently, researchers have introduced
elements of government fiscal policy into these
models to help match various business cycle
facts. For example, Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992) include stochastic government spending
in the household utility function to help explain
the low observed correlation between labor
hours and real wages (as measured by average
labor productivity) in postwar U.S. data. This
works in their model because shocks to gov-
ernment spending impact the marginal utility
of private consumption and thereby induce
shifts in the household labor supply. These
interact with labor demand shifts (caused by
technology shocks) to produce a low correlation
between wages and hours. Braun (1994) and
McGrattan (1994) show that a similar result can
be obtained by introducing stochastic distor-
tionary taxes to shift the labor supply curve. A
common feature of these studies is that govern-
ment policy is viewed as exogenous.
In this paper, we develop an RBC model in
which government fiscal variables such as tax
rates and public expenditures are endogenous.
Our objective is to characterize the "optimal"
behavior of these policy variables over the
business cycle and to relate this behavior to
movements in private-sector variables like out-
put, consumption, labor hours, and investment.
As a benchmark, we also provide a comparison
between the model and U.S. data.
We build on the recent work of Chari, Chris-
tiano, and Kehoe (1994), who develop a com-
petitive RBC model in which a government
policymaker chooses an optimal sequence of dis-
tortionary taxes on labor and capital income in a
dynamic version of the Ramsey (1927) optimal
tax problem. Our model differs from theirs in
three main respects. First, we introduce monopoly-
profits into the production sector of the economy-
such that the optimal steady-state tax on capital is
positive, consistent with U.S. observations. In a
competitive model, this tax rate is zero (see Judd
[19851 and Chamley [1986]). Second, our modelincorporates the "indivisible labor" specification
of Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985). In
standard RBC models (which abstract from
government), the indivisible labor specification
serves to increase the variability of hours rela-
tive to the real wage to a value that is more in
line with U.S. data. Third, we endogenize the
time series of government spending by includ-
ing in household preferences a separable term
that represents the utility provided by public
goods. In the Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe
model, government spending follows an exoge-
nous stochastic process.
We compare simulations from our model to
post-WWII, annual U.S. data and an otherwise
similar model with nondistortionary lump-sum
taxes. Our results can be summarized as follows:
For a given stochastic process of the technology
shock, we find that optimal distortionary taxes
reduce the variability of output and labor hours,
but increase the relative variability of household
investment, compared to the model with lump-
sum taxes. This result can be traced to the behav-
ior of the optimal distortionary tax rates on labor
and capital income. The optimal labor tax in the
model is procyclical, which reduces the variability
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of hours (and output) by providing households
with an implicit insurance mechanism against
variations in their after-tax wage. The optimal
capital tax in the model is countercyclical and dis-
plays a high standard deviation relative to the
labor tax. This tends to increase the variability' of
household investment relative to output, but pro-
vides an efficient means of absorbing shocks to
the government's budget (which are caused by
changes in the size of the tax base over the busi-
ness cycle).
In addition, we find that the distortionary tax
model underpredicts the variability of hours
worked relative to the real wage in U.S. data, de-
spite our specification of indivisible labor. This
result is due to the procyclical optimal labor tax,
which tends to reduce the variability of hours
worked in comparison to a standard RBC model
with indivisible labor. Finally, both model versions
capture the procyclical behavior of government
spending in annual U.S. data, but underpredict
its variability over the business cycle. We find that
this comparison, as w
rell as comparisons along
some other dimensions, are substantially improved
if we exclude U.S. data prior to 1954 to avoid the
influence of the Korean War. However, a few
comparisons, such as the correlation between gov-
ernment spending and output, become worse.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: Sections I and II describe the model and
the solution method. The choice of parameter
values is discussed in section III. Section IV
examines the business cycle characteristics of
the two tax structures and compares them to
U.S. data. Concluding remarks are presented in
section V.
I. The Model
The model economy consists of three types of
agents: households, firms, and the govern-
ment. Households obtain direct utility from
government-provided public goods, which are
financed by taxes on households and firms.
Following Benhabib and Farmer (1994), we
postulate that firms which produce intermedi-
ate goods exhibit some degree of monopoly
power such that they realize positive economic
profits even though the final-goods sector of
the economy is perfectly competitive. The prof-
its are equal to the difference between the
value of output and the payments made to in-
puts. The reason for introducing profits is to
obtain a positive optimal tax rate on capital un-
der the distortionary tax staicture, consistent
with U.S. observations.
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As owners of the firms, households receive
net profits in the form of dividends. It is as-
sumed that profits are initially taxed at the firm
level, then distributed as dividends and taxed
again at the household level. This formulation
is intended to capture the double taxation of
corporate dividends in the U.S. economy. Further-
more, under the distortionary tax structure, we
assume that the government can distinguish
between labor and capital income, but cannot
distinguish between the various categories of
capital income, such as profits, dividends, bond
interest, and capital rental income. Therefore,
this version of the model includes only two
types of distortionary taxes: a labor tax and a
capital tax.
• 1 Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993) show that the existence of
profits and a restriction on the menu of available tax instruments (the ab-
sence of a separate profits tax) is one method of obtaining a positive opti-
mal tax rate on capital in the steady state. Without profits, the optima!
steady-state tax on capital is zero.The Household's
Problem
There is a continuum of identical, infinitely
lived households, each of which maximizes a
stream of discounted utilities over sequences
of consumption and leisure:
(1) max
- . b . k . h
E, P' ( lnc,- A ht+ B\ngt)
0<P< 1, A,B>0.
In this utility function, p is the household dis-
count factor and ct represents private consump-
tion goods. The symbol Et is the expectation
operator conditional on information available at
time t. Each household is endowed with one
unit of time each period and works ht hours dur-
ing period t. The fact that utility is linear in hours
worked draws on the formulation of indivisible
labor described by Rogerson (1988) and Hansen
(1985). This means that all fluctuations in labor
hours are due to changes in the number of work-
ers employed, as opposed to variations in hours
per worker.
2 Household preferences also include
a term representing the utility provided by aggre-
gate public consumption goods gt. The separabil-
ity in ct and gt implies that public consumption
does not affect the marginal utility of private con-
sumption, a specification supported by parameter
estimates in McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright
(1993). Households view gt as outside their con-
trol. Examples of public consumption goods that
might affect household utility are national de-
fense, police protection, and government provi-
sion of food and shelter during naairal disasters.
Public goods are assumed to be noncongestable
and free of specific user charges.
The representative household faces the fol-
lowing within-period budget constraint:
(2) ct + xt+bl+,<(l-tbt)u>tht
+ {l-xkt)(rtkl+nl + rhlbt)
ko,bo given,
where xt is investment, kt is the stock of physi-
cal capital, and bl+l represents one-period, real
government bonds carried into period t + 1 by
the household. Households derive income by
supplying labor and capital services to firms at
rental rates wt and rt, and pay taxes on labor and
capital income at rates xht and Tkl, respectively.
Two additional sources of household income are
the firm's net profits, jt, (which are distributed
to households as dividends), and the interest
earned on government bonds, rhl bt. Dividends
and interest are taxed at the same rate as capital
rental income, rtkr The term Tfe5&, represents
the depreciation allowance built into the U.S. tax
code, and Tt is a lump-sum tax.
The following equation describes the law of
motion for the capital stock, given a constant
rate of depreciation 8:
(3) £,+ 1 = (1-8) 0<8<l.
Households view tax rates, wages, interest




The household first-order conditions with respect
to the indicated variables and the associated
transversality conditions (TVC) are
(4a) c,: X. = —
(4b) hr. Xt(l-xhl)wt = A
(4O kl
(4e) TVC: lim Eo = 0 ,
where X, is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the budget constraint (2) in period t. The
interpretation of Xt is that it represents the
• 2 The linearity of (1) in ht implies that the effective labor-supply elas-
ticity of the representative household is infinite. In a decentralized economy,
both Rogerson and Hansen show that this utility function can be supported
by a lottery that randomly assigns workers to employment or unemployment
each period, with the firm providing full unemployment insurance. Wage
contracts call for households to be paid based on their expected (rather than
actual) number of hours worked. RBC models with indivisible labor are better
able to match some key characteristics of aggregate labor market data. Spe-
cifically, U.S. data display a large variability of hours worked relative to the
real wage, and a weak correlation between hours and the real wage (see
Christiano and Eichenbaum [1992]).I
marginal utility of an additional unit of after-tax in-
come received in period t. The transversality con-
ditions ensure that the household's within-period
budget constraint (2) can be transformed into an
infinite-horizon, present-value budget constraint.
The Firm's Problem
This section closely follows the model devel-
oped by Benhabib and Farmer (1994). Suppose
there exists a continuum of intermediate goods
yjt, i e [0,1] and a unique final good yt that is







We assume that the final-goods sector is per-
fectly competitive, but that intermediate-goods
producers exert a degree of monopoly power
that is captured by the parameter %. In the spe-
cial case when % = 1, all intermediate goods are
perfect substitutes in the production of the final
good, and the intermediate sector becomes per-
fectly competitive.
Each intermediate good is produced using the
same technology, with labor and capital as inputs:
(6)
0 < a,. < 1, 0Cj + oc2 = 1
(7) zt+1 = pzzt+et+v 0<pz<l,
E, ~ i.i.d. (0, oE
2 ), z0 given,
where (7) is the law of motion for aggregate tech-
nology shocks zt, which are revealed to agents
at the beginning of period t and which generate
business cycle fluctuations in the model. Under
the assumptions that firms maximize profits and
factor markets are competitive, Benhabib and
Farmer show that in a symmetric equilibrium
(kit= kt and hu= ht for all z), the aggregate pro-
duction function, the rental rate on capital, and
the real wage are
(8a) v
(8c) M', = 82^> 92 = XOt2.
Due to their monopoly power, intermediate-
goods producers earn an economic profit that
is taxed at rate xkr The firm's after-tax profits,







The government chooses an optimal program
of taxes, borrowing, and public expenditures
in order to maximize the discounted utility of
the household. This is a dynamic version of the
Ramsey (1927) optimal tax problem, where xhn
xkl, rhl, gt, and Tt summarize government pol-
icy implemented at time t. To set up this prob-
lem, we begin by spelling out some important
assumptions. First, we assume that the govern-
ment can commit to a set of time-invariant de-
cision rules that specify policy variables as a
function of state variables. This is done to avoid
the complicating issue of time inconsistency,
which arises in policy design problems when
the tax base includes fixed assets (such as capi-
tal or bonds) that cannot be quickly adjusted
in response to a change in the level of the tax.
In these situations, the government has an in-
centive to deviate from its originally announced,
optimal policy by implementing surprise in-
creases in asset taxes in order to obtain nondis-
tortionary tax revenue. Because households
understand that the original policy is time incon-
sistent, it cannot be supported as an equilibrium
unless the government can commit itself (and all
successor governments) to carrying out the plan.
3
Second, given that the initial stocks of capital
and bonds are fixed, we rule out any confisca-
tory taxes on assets at t = 0 that might be used
to finance all future expendiaires. This case is
not very interesting because no taxes beyond the
initial period are required. With these assump-
tions, the government's problem is
(8b) yt • 3 The time inconsistency problem does not arise under the lump-
sum tax structure because taxes are nondistortionary. See Chari (1994)
for a summary of the issues and a review of the literature dealing with
time inconsistency problems and optimal policy design.I
(10) max
subject to
(i) household first-order conditions and the
budget constraint.
(ii) firm profit-maximization conditions,
(iii) R = bll-b,{\ + rhl)
+ [l-(l-T^)
2] (1-9,-0^,+ Tr
(iv) Tt = 0 for the distortionary tax structure,




As a condition for equilibrium, government
policy must take into account the rational re-
sponses of households and firms, as summarized
by constraints (i) and (ii). The chosen policy
must also satisfy the government's within-period
budget constraint (iii), where the squared term
on the right-hand side reflects the double taxa-
tion of firm dividends. Constraints (iv) and (v)
impose the restrictions associated with the two
tax staictures we intend to analyze. For the dis-
tortionary tax structure, we rule out the possi-
bility of lump-sum taxes. For the lump-sum tax
structure, we set xht and xkl equal to zero. Fi-
nally, (vi) is a transversality condition ensuring
that the government budget constraint is satis-
fied in present-value terms. The summation of
the household budget constraint and the gov-
ernment budget constraint yields the following
resource constraint for the economy:
(11) yt=ct+xt
Because the resource constraint and the govern-
ment budget constraint are not independent
equations, equation (11) will be used in place of
(iii) in solving the government's problem.
II. Solving
the Model
Our approach to solving the government's prob-
lem is to find the allocations cn hr kt + ,, and
bt+l that maximize household utility subject to
the constraints, where allocations are ex-
pressed as functions of the economy's state
variables. The appropriate set of prices rt and
ivt and the policy variables xhr xkr rht, gt, and Tt that decentralize the optimal allocations can
be computed using the profit-maximization
conditions (8), the household first-order condi-
tions (4), the household budget constraint (2),
and the resource constraint (ID.
4 For example,
the optimal allocations uniquely determine Xt
and iv! through equations (4a) and (8c). Given
X, and wr the household's first-order condition
for ht, equation (4b), uniquely determines the
government's optimal choice for xhl. The gov-
ernment has much more flexibility, however, in
choosing the optimal capital tax and the optimal
interest rate on government debt. The expecta-
tion operators in the household's first-order
conditions for kl+l and bl + l , equations (4c) and
(4d), imply that the after-tax returns on capital
and bonds (weighted by marginal utility) must
be the same ''on average." In response to a se-
ries of shocks, the government can satisfy this
ex ante arbitrage condition and implement the
optimal allocations using many different combi-
nations for the period-by-period values of Xkl
and rht. Consequently, the stochastic version
of the model does not uniquely pin down the
time-series behavior of these policy variables
(see Zhu [19921 and Chari, Christiano, and Ke-
hoe [1994] for a more complete description).
To facilitate a comparison with U.S. data,
we make a particular assumption about the
way in which the government picks xkt and rht
to decentralize a set of allocations. Specifically,
we employ the certainty versions of (4c) and
(4d) to identify xkt and rhl each period. Requiring
the government to satisfy the certainty versions
of these constraints guarantees that the uncer-
tainty versions will also be satisfied. Essentially,
we are restricting the policy instruments available
to the government by ailing out fully flexible,
state-contingent capital taxes and bond interest
rates. This might be interpreted as reflecting the
political infeasibility of some types of policy re-
gimes. The restriction we impose has an impact
on the behavior of the allocations in response to
stochastic shocks, as does any other restriction
• 4 This method of solving the government's problem is described
as the "primal" approach by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), chapter 12.on the set of available policy instalments (such as
ruling out lump-sum taxes). Consequently, the allo-
cations we compute in response to shocks are dif-
ferent from the "Ramsey allocations" that could be
supported in an unrestricted environment.
1 In the
restricted case, the government's decision rules
for xkl and rhl are identical to those for an econ-
omy with no uncertainty. It is important to note
that this result follows from a particular decentral-
ization scheme. However, our solution method
also employs a linear-quadratic approximation of
the problem. Thus, the decision rules governing
household allocations also display the property
of certainty equivalence.'
Given these assumptions, the government's
problem with distortionary taxes can be solved
using a recursive algorithm developed by Kyd-
land and Prescott (1980b). The problem with
lump-sum taxes can be solved by adopting the
view of a social planner for an appropriately
defined "pseudo-economy" in which the plan-
ner cannot exploit the monopoly power of
firms. The government's problem under lump-
sum taxes is not equivalent to a standard social
planning problem because when % < I, the de-
centralized equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.
The pseudo-economy approach is an indirect
method of obtaining the equilibrium allocations
(see Stokey and Lucas [1989], chapter 18). Gov-
ernment debt does not appear in the pseudo-
planner's problem. This reflects the well-
known "Ricardian proposition," which states
that government ciebt policy is irrelevant to the
determination of equilibrium allocations in an
economy with lump-sum taxes (see Sargent
[1987], chapter 3). Since debt doesn't matter in
this case, we arbitrarily set it equal to zero
each period such that g t= Tr The pseudo-
planner's problem is recursive and can be
solved using standard methods.
III. Calibrating
the Model to the
U.S. Economy
To explore the quantitative predictions of the
model, we assign parameter values based on
empirically observed features of post-WWII
U.S. data. The time period in the model is
taken to be one year, which is consistent with
both the time frame of most government fiscal
decisions and the frequency of available data
on average marginal tax rates. The discount
factor p (= 0.962) implies an annual rate of
time preference of 4 percent. The parameter A
in the household utility function is chosen such
that the fraction of time spent working is close
to 0.3 in the steady state for each tax structure.
This coincides with time-use studies, such as
Juster and Stafford (1991), which indicate that
households spend approximately one-third of
their discretionary time in market work. The
value of B is chosen to yield a steady-state
value of g/y near 0.22 for each tax staicture,
the average ratio of government spending to
GNP for the U.S. economy from 1947 to 1992.
8
The steady-state level of government debt is
chosen to yield a steady-state ratio of b/y
equal to 0.45. This is the average value of U.S.
federal debt held by the public as a fraction of
GNP from 1947 to 1992.
9
The exponents in the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function are chosen on the basis of
two criteria. First, the selected values of 0,
(= 0.31) and 9, (= 0.60) are in the range of the
estimated shares of GNP received by capital
and labor in the U.S. economy (see Christiano
[1988]). Second, the model's share of output
devoted to monopoly profits (=1 - 0, - 0, ) is
chosen to yield a reasonable value for the
steady-state tax on capital (T^ ) under the distor-
tionary tax structure. Because a separate profits
tax is not available in this case, the government
uses the tax on private capital to recapture a
portion of the profits. In the model, the steady-
state ratio of profits to output is 0.09, and the
• 5 See Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) for examples of decentrali-
zations that support the Ramsey allocations. See Cassou (forthcoming) for a
case where policy instruments are restricted to follow a univariate Markov
process in response to government spending shocks.
• 6 The approximate version of the problem involves the maximiza-
tion of a quadratic objective function subject to linear constraints. Since
the first-order conditions are linear in all variables, the expectation opera-
tor can be passed through the expressions, dropping out stochastic
terms associated with the technology shock innovation e /+1 in equation
(7). See Sargent (1987), p. 36.
• 7 A technical appendix to this paper, available from the authors
upon request, describes the details of our solution procedure.
• 8 The specific parameter values used in the computations are
A = 2.50, B = 0.350 for the distortionary tax structure, and A = 3.48,
B = 0.381 for the lump-sum tax structure.
• 9 The model does not pin down a unique value for the steady-state
level of government debt (see Chamiey [1985]). Rather, steady-state debt
is a function of the initial level of debt, 60, and the entire transition path
of taxes and spending from t= 0 until the steady state is reached. As an
alternative to performing this difficult computation, we follow the ap-
proach of Lucas (1990) and simply choose the level of steady-state debt
to reflect a debt-to-GNP ratio consistent with the data. We assume that b0
and the transition path are set such that the government budget constraint
is satisfied in present-value terms. Data on U.S. federal debt held by the
public are from Federal Debt and Interest Costs, Congressional Budget
Office, 1993, table A-2.resulting steady-state tax on capital is 0.31. This
value of xk approximates the average effective
corporate tax rate in the United States from
1947 to 1980, as estimated by Jorgenson and
Sullivan (1981).
1
0 The steady-state tax on labor
(xh) turns out to be 0.25. This is close to the
average marginal tax rate on labor income
from 1947 to 1983, as estimated by Barro and
Sahasakul (1986). The U.S. tax rate estimates
can be viewed as summarizing the various ele-
ments of the tax code that impact the behavior
of agents. These include not only the statutory
rate, but also the many types of exemptions,
deductions, credits, and allowances.
The monopoly power parameter % is chosen
such that the aggregate production technology
demonstrates constant returns to scale. Given
the values chosen for 0t and Q7, a value of




capital depreciation rate 8 (= 0.07) is consistent
with values commonly used in the RBC litera-
ture. Together with the values of (3 and 0,. this
depreciation rate implies a steady-state ratio of
capital to output ranging from 2.4 (under the
distortionary tax structure) to 2.8 (under the
lump-sum tax staicture), and a ratio of invest-
ment to output ranging from 0.17 to 0.20. The
corresponding average ratios for the U.S. econ-
omy from 1947 to 1992 are 2.58 and 0.21. The
process governing technology shocks is esti-
mated using annual data from 1947 to 1992. The
series for zt was constructed by computing the
changes in output not accounted for by changes
in the productive inputs.
1
1 The parameter esti-
mates, pz= 0.85 and oE = 0.015, are close to
those estimated by other studies using annual
data, such as Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991).
IV. Simulation
Results
In this section, we describe the model's predic-
tions for the behavior of fiscal policy over the
business cycle and provide a comparison with
U.S. data. The simulation results are shown in
• 10 Higher profit levels imply a higher steady-state tax on capital in
our model. When profits are zero (9, + 62 = 1), the optimal steady-state
tax on capital is zero. If a separate profits tax were available, the govern-
ment would choose to tax profits at 100 percent and other capital income
at 0 percent in the steady state (see footnote 1).
• 11 The production function residual was measured as zt=\nGNPt-
0.34ln/lrf— 0.66lnftr The private capital stock kt is defined as fixed private
capital + stock of consumer durables + residential capital from Fixed Repro-
ducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce,
1993. Real GNP and the labor input (/?, = LHOURS) are from Citibase.
tables 1-2 and figures 1-5. Note that the distor-
tionary tax structure makes predictions for a
larger set of variables than does the lump-sum
tax structure. The additional variables are the
stock of real government debt, bt, and the
average marginal tax rates on labor and capital
income, xht and xkl.
u
In comparison to the full sample of U.S. data
from 1947 to 1992, both tax structures under-
predict the standard deviation of output ( yt),
consumption (c,), government expenditures
(gt), and hours (/?,), but overpredict the stan-
dard deviation of investment (xf). Since we
employ a general-equilibrium framework, the
behavior of one variable cannot be viewed in
isolation, because it is linked by the equilib-
rium conditions to the behavior of other vari-
ables in the model. For example, the low
variability of output is linked to the low vari-
ability of hours, because the production tech-
nology is labor intensive.
1
3 Likewise, the low-
variability of consumption is linked to the high
variability of investment, because changes in
household saving (which correspond to changes
in investment) act as a buffer against earnings
shocks, thereby allowing households to smooth
their consumption over the business cycle. Con-
sistent with standard RBC models (see Kydland
and Prescott [1982]), both model versions cap-
ture the fact that output is more variable than
consumption, but less variable than investment,
over the U.S. business cycle.
In comparison to the lump-sum tax staicture,
the distortionary tax staicture displays a low
rer
standard deviation of output and hours and a
higher variability of investment relative to out-
put. This behavior can be traced to the move-
ment of the optimal distortionary tax rates on
labor and capital income. Specifically, the opti-
mal labor tax is procyclical (positively corre-
lated with output), while the optimal capital tax
is countercyclical. The procyclical labor tax oper-
ates to smooth households' after-tax income from
labor. For example, a positive technology shock
(which shifts the production frontier outward
and raises the real wage) is accompanied by an
increase in xht. The higher tax rate tends to offset
the higher real wage and thus provides households
with an implicit insurance mechanism against
• 12 In all figures, model variables are the realizations from a single
simulation (based on randomly drawn shocks) to compare volatility and
persistence properties with the corresponding U.S. variables. There is no
intention to predict the actual time path of U.S. variables.
• 13 This can be readily observed from the aggregate production
function (eguation [8a]), where the coefficient on the labor input, a2 =
0.66, is nearly double the coefficient on the capital input, a,= 0.34.I
TABLE 1
Business Cycle Statistics for



































































































































a. Model statistics are means over 100 simulations, each 46 periods long, after
dropping the first 50 periods. The symbol Rer/y is the economy-wide average
tax rate, defined as total tax revenue as a fraction of output.
b. The following quarterly series from Citibase were annualized before computing
the statistics: y,= GNPQ. c, = GCNQ + GCSQ (nondurable* + services), g, = GGF.Q,
h,= LHOi:RS (household survey), and })/h,= GXPQ, LHOURS. The series for x,
is business fixed investment + consumer durable expenditures + residential invest-
ment. The series for k, is fixed private capital + stock of consumer durables + resi-
dential capital. Both x, and fc, are annual series from Fixed Reproducible Tangible
Wealth in the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993. The series for
b, is federal debt held by the public from Federal Debt and Interest Costs. Congres-
sional Budget Office. 1993. table A-2, where nominal debt has been converted
into real debt by dividing by the GNP deflator for each year. Rer/'y, is total gov-
ernment receipts (federal, state, and local) as a fraction of GNP from Economic
Report of the President, 1991, 1994, table B-80. Data on average marginal tax rates
do not extend over the full sample: \hl is from Barro and Sahasakul (1986) for
19i7-K3, and \kl is from Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981). table 11, for 1917-80.
NOTE: Before computing the statistics, all series were logged and detrended using
the Hodrick—Prescott filter (see Prescolt [19861). The smoothing parameter for the
filter was set at 100, since all data arc at annual frequency.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
variability in the after-tax wage (1 - xhl) wr
Since labor supply decisions depend on the
quantity (1 - xhl) wt (see equation [4b]), a
lower variability in the after-tax wage leads to
a lower variability in hours worked. With a
labor-intensive production technology, this
also leads to lower variability in output.
Zhu (1992) shows theoretically that the cycli-
cal behavior of the optimal labor tax depends
on the degree of risk aversion (or curvature)
exhibited by the household utility function. The
optimal labor tax is procyclical for low-risk-
aversion (less curved) utility functions, such as
the logarithmic case used here, but counter-
cyclical for high-risk-aversion (more curved)
functions. Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994)
provide a quantitative demonstration of this re-
sult. In general, the level of risk aversion deter-
mines the amount by which households are
willing to adjust their labor supply in response
to a change in the real wage. With low risk
aversion, the substitution effect of an increase
in wt (caused by a positive technology shock)
results in a relatively large increase in labor
hours. The government takes advantage of this
greater willingness to work by raising the tax
on labor, thereby collecting additional reve-
nue, but still allowing an increase in labor to
spur output during this period of high labor
productivity. With high risk aversion, however,
the substitution effect is much smaller; that is,
households are less willing to increase their
labor supply in response to the higher real
wage. The government's optimal response now
is to lower the tax rate on labor. This stimulates
labor supply in order to boost output while
labor productivity is high. Our results are con-
sistent with the findings of these researchers.
The capital tax in the model moves counter-
cyclically and displays high variability relative to
the labor tax (see table 1 and figures 1-2). This
serves to increase the variability of household in-
vestment relative to output under the distortion-
ary tax structure. Ordinarily, a positive technology
shock raises the real rate of interest and motivates
an increase in investment because the rate of
return becomes more attractive. However,
when a positive technology shock is accompa-
nied by a decrease in xkt, the after-tax return
on investment becomes even more appealing,
leading to a larger rise in investment. From the
government's perspective, a countercyclical
capital tax is optimal because it serves as an
efficient means of absorbing shocks to the gov-
ernment's budget constraint. These shocks are
caused by changes in the size of the tax base
over the the business cycle. For example, a
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revenue because GNP and household incomes
(the tax base) increase. This motivates a reduc-
tion in Xkl because government spending require-
ments can be met using a lower tax rate. A similar
argument holds in reverse for the case of a nega-
tive technology shock. Absorbing shocks mainly
by changes in Tkl, as opposed to changes in Xht,
is efficient because the capital stock cannot be
quickly adjusted in response to a change in the
capital tax. In contrast, the household can instan-
taneously adjust labor supply in response to a
change in the labor tax. The shock-absorbing
feature of T^ allows the government to maintain
a very smooth time series for gt/ yn as compared
to the lump-sum tax structure (see figure 3).
1
4
We experimented with varying the level of
monopoly profits by adjusting the values of
the parameters 0; , 8,, and % . In general, we
found that as profits declined, the standard de-
viation of xkt i ncreased. The intuition for this
result is straightforward. Recall that dividends
(equal to after-tax profits) do not distort house-
hold decisions because profits are determined
outside households' control. A lower level of
profits implies a smaller and more elastic tax
base for the capital tax. Consequently, larger
changes in the tax rate are needed to produce
the same revenue effect when responding to
technology shocks.
The model's prediction that the capital tax
should display more variability than the labor
tax is consistent with the U.S. tax-rate estimates
we have chosen for comparison.
1^ Note, how-
ever, that the correlation coefficients between
U.S. tax rates and real GNP display a change
in sign, depending on the sample period. The
labor tax and the capital tax are weakly procy-
clical using data on average marginal tax rates
that begin in 1947, but weakly countercyclical
for data that begin in 1954. The model, on the
other hand, predicts a strongly procyclical labor
tax and a strongly countercyclical capital tax.
Thus, there is a sharp negative correlation
• 14 The optimality of using a state-contingent capital tax to absorb
budget shocks has been shown previously by Judd (1989) and Chari,
Christiano, and Kehoe (1994). Our quantitative results are not directly
comparable because Judd does not explicitly model household behavior,
and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe employ a different decentralization
scheme for T^ andrw.
• 15 The figures display the tax-rate series before detrending. For
quantitative comparisons (table 1), detrending is necessary because the U.S.
labor tax displays a distinct upward trend, while the U.S. capital tax displays
a downward trend. These trends have no counterpart in the model. The trend
in xh! is possibly linked to the phenomenon of "bracket creep," which ex-
isted before tax schedules were indexed for inflation in 1985. Auerbach and
Poterba (1988) argue that the downward trend in xw is due to increasingly
generous investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation schedules.•
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a. Distortionary tax structure.
SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office, Federal Debt and Interest Costs, 1993;
and authors' calculations.
between xkl and zht in the model, while the
corresponding correlation in the data is weakly
positive.
1
0 Figure 4 displays the economywide
average tax rate, defined as total tax revenue
as a fraction of output. This rate is countercycli-
cal in both versions of the model, but weakly
procyclical in the U.S. data. Thus, the model
does not capture some important features of
U.S. tax-rate movements. This highlights the dif-
ficulty of summarizing the entire U.S. tax code
using only one or two broadly defined rates.
The predicted standard deviations for gt are
substantially lower than the U.S. value of 6.45
percent computed using the full sample. Start-
ing the sample in 1954 to avoid the influence of
the Korean War reduces the standard deviation
of gt in the data by half, to a value of 3.04 per-
cent, which is much closer to model predic-
tions. Although we have no theoretical justifica-
tion for excluding the Korean War years (since
we include the Vietnam War), the fact that our
model contains only one type of shock limits
its ability to explain large movements associ-
ated with a war. Incorporating an additional
shock to households' preference for public
goods to simulate high demand during wars
would increase the variability of gf in the model
(see Lansing [1994]). Both model versions capture
the procyclical behavior of government spending
in annual U.S. data, but the correlations from the
model are much stronger than observed in the
data. When the years prior to 1954 are excluded,
the correlation between government spending
and real output in the U.S. data drops from 0.62
to 0.40, worsening the comparison with the model.
In the distortionary tax structure, government
debt is essentially acyciical (it behaves similarly
to capital in this respect), but is less variable
than U.S. government debt (see figure 5). We
experimented with an alternate version of this
model in which the government is required to
balance its budget each period. For this experi-
ment, we retained the decentralization scheme
described in section II, whereby the govern-
ment is required to satisfy the certainty version
of equation (4c). Qualitatively, the results are
similar to those reported in table 1. However,
the variability of the labor tax goes up, since
government debt is no longer available to help
cushion budget shocks. The insurance effect of
the procyclical labor tax thus becomes more
significant, leading to lower variability in hours
and output. Interestingly, our model implies
that a balanced-budget amendment can help
smooth business cycle fluctuations, provided
the government sets tax rates in the manner
we have described.
The lump-sum tax structure does a reason-
ably good job of matching the relative standard
deviations of hours and the real wage, where
the real wage is measured by average labor
productivity yt/ ht (see table 2). This behavior
is typical of standard RBC models with indivis-
ible labor (see Hansen [1985]). In the distortion-
ary tax structure, however, the standard devia-
tion of hours relative to the real wage is too low,
despite the specification of indivisible labor.
The insurance effect of the procyclical labor tax
• 16 In the U.S. data, the correlation coefficient between (logged and
detrended) xhl and xu equals 0.36 from 1947 to 1980, the period for
which estimates of both tax rates are available. For the years 1954 to 1980,
the correlation coefficient is 0.34. In the model, the correlation coefficient
is-0.97.TABLE 2























a. Model statistics are means over 100 simulations, each 46 periods long, after
dropping the first SO periods.
b. The first number denotes hours worked from the household survey in
Citibase (I.HOURS), and the second denotes hours worked from the estab-
lishment survey (LPMHU).
NOTE: Before computing the statistics, all series were logged and delrended
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (see Prescott [1986]). The smoothing parame-
ter for the filter was set at 100, since all data are at annual frequency.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
is responsible for the reduced variability of
hours. Again, we note that the model includes
only one type of shock. Aiyagari (1994) uses a
variance decomposition analysis to argue that
the behavior of hours in U.S. data is driven by
multiple shocks.
Finally, the predicted correlations between
hours and productivity in table 2 are much
higher than the corresponding U.S. values.
Braun (1994) shows that an RBC model with
exogenous stochastic tax rates is capable of
matching both of the U.S. labor market statis-
tics in the table. Our simulations show that a




We have constatcted a model that combines
elements from the theory of optimal public fi-
nance with an RBC view of aggregate fluctua-
tions. Our aim is to develop a framework that
is useful for carrying out realistic policy experi-
ments with regard to both the structure of the
U.S. tax system and the composition and fi-
nancing of government expenditures. In two
related papers (see Guo and Lansing
[1994a. 1994b]), we employ models similar to
• 17 See Chan, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) for a more extensive
comparison between an RBC model with exogenous stochastic tax rates
and one with optimal Ramsey tax rates.
this one to explore the welfare effects of vari-
ous tax structures and find that these effects
can be quite dramatic. In this paper, our
model meets with varying degrees of success
in matching the observed behavior of tax rates,
government spending, and aggregate eco-
nomic variables in the U.S. economy. Nonethe-
less, this exercise is useful in that it provides
information on how models of government fis-
cal policy might be improved.
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